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Abstract
In this paper, we use a two-period overlapping generations model to examine the be-
havior of an economy that incorporates intergenerational transfers of time. In the first
part, we describe the dynamics and steady state of the economy in which there is no gov-
ernment. We show that the rate of life expectancy has negative impact on the steady-state
level of the capital stock. In the second part, we study the role and the effect of public
long-term care policy. We also show that public long-term care lowers the steady-state
level of the capital stock but enhances the welfare when the rate of tax is small.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers of Becker (1965) and Barro (1974), there have been many studies of
intergenerational transfers (see, for example, Weil (1987) and Abel (1987)) Almost all argue
that altruism and the way in which transfers are made are important determinants of dynamic
allocation. Any theory of intergenerational transfers depends on the way in which transfers are
made. One involves transferring goods and the other involves transferring time. In the context
of these studies, intergenerational transfers of time are likely to become more prominent given
that the economy is ‘graying’ at a rapid rate.1 Because physical and mental health tend
to deteriorate with age, the number of people needing more time-intensive transfers such as
health care and other health services increases. For example, in the developed countries, the
average density of practicing nurses per thousand people was about 2.5 in 1960 and around
8.1 in 2003 (OECD (2005)). In Japan, about 94.8% of people needing care are over 65 years
of age. In particular, family care accounts for 74.4% of the total. Care undertaken by children
accounts for 39.1% of all care (Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfares (2004)).
When labor supply decisions are endogenous, given that young agents can choose to trans-
fer their time between to work in the household contributing to household-produced health or
can work in the market producing market goods, intergenerational transfers of time become an
important issue when the population is aging. This is because the demand for care increases
with population aging. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the intergenerational transfer of
time allocated to health care and examine the interaction between intergenerational transfers
of time and the macroeconomy when there is population aging.
Population aging, along with increasing associated health care costs, has received much
attention Almost all studies have been empirical (see, for example, Lakdawalla and Philip-
son (2002)). Despite the importance of empirical work, intergenerational transfers of time
allocated to health care have received little theoretical attention. In recent theoretical work,
Bednarek and Pecchenino (2002) and Tabata (2005) have theoretically analyzed the health
care issue using goods-related transfers. Unlike these studies, this paper examines time-related
transfers. Specifically, our study examines the impact of intergenerational transfers of time
and public long-term care policy on capital stock and welfare. For this purpose, we employ a
two-period overlapping generations model that incorporates uncertainties about lifespan and
1According to the United Nations (2006), the total number of persons aged 60 years or older has tripled
over the last 50 years, and is projected to more than triple again over the next 50 years.
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illness in old age.
In the model developed, we assume that old agents have a production technology for health
and produce own health in the household by using time. When agents derive utility from their
aged parents’ health status, intergenerational transfers of time are modeled by allowing young
agents to contribute to the work undertaken in the household on household-produced health.2
In what follows, we refer to intergenerational transfers of time synonymously with providing
care to aged parents and synonymously with care provision.
In our model, the population of every generation is assumed to be the same size. Thus, a
rise in life expectancy increases the ratio of the old-age population to the young-age population,
and thereby constitutes population aging. Using our model, in the first part of the paper, we
describe the dynamics and steady state of the economy in which there is no government. By
analyzing this model, we show that the rate of life expectancy has two opposing effects on
the steady-state level of the capital stock. One is the ‘demographic effect’, which operates
through aggregate care provision to aged parents. Because aggregate care provision increases
with population aging, through this effect, an increase in life expectancy reduces the steady-
state level of the capital stock. The other is the ‘time preference effect’. In our model, the
interest rate is an increasing function of life expectancy and, thus, an increase in life expectancy
in our model is synonymous with the rate of time preference as incorporated in models such
as those of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985). Therefore, through this effect, an increase in
life expectancy increases the steady-state level of the capital stock. At the steady state, the
negative demographic effect is exclusive the positive time preference effect, thus the net effect
becomes negative.
In the second part of the paper, we examine the role and the effect of public long-term
care policy, that is, LTC. When we assume that LTC is financed by taxing the income of
young agents, and when young agents transfer their time to provide public care, LTC lowers
labor supply to firms. A decrease in labor supply also reduces savings, and thereby lowers the
steady-state level of the capital stock.
In addition, we show the effect of LTC on welfare. The effect of LTC is considered to
comprise a ‘health status effect’, a ‘capital stock effect’, and a ‘subsidy effect’. The health
status effect shows how health status affects welfare. Because LTC improves health status,
2Intergenerational transfers of time using household production have been studied by Cardia and Michel
(2004). Since the seminal paper of Grossman (1972), many papers have been devoted to analyzing household
health production (see, for example, Wagstaff (1986), Jacobson (2000)).
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this effect on welfare is positive. LTC also has a capital stock effect on welfare. Because LTC
lowers the steady-state level of the capital stock, the steady-state level of welfare is lowered.
In addition to these two effects, we have the subsidy effect on welfare. Because old agents can
receive public care provision without being taxed, this effect improves the steady-state level
of welfare of old agents. By comparing these effects, we show that LTC is welfare enhancing
when the rate of tax is small.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 analyzes the equilibrium in which there is no government. Section 4 examines the role and
effect of LTC on the dynamic equilibrium. Section 5 shows the effect of LTC on welfare.
Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period overlapping generations model that incorporates uncertainty about
lifespan and illness status in old age. Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. The
economy begins operating in period 1, and the cohort born in period t is known as generation
t. Generation t is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 agents who live for a maximum of two
periods, that is, young and old. At each date, new generations, each consisting of a continuum
of agents with a unit measure, are born. They are endowed with one unit of time when young
and old. Those who are old in period 0 are the initial old.
Agents
Agents have altruism and derive utility from the state of their aged parents’ health. The
probability that an agent lives through the period of old age is p ∈ (0, 1). The probability that
an individual dies at the beginning of the period of old age, after having had a child is 1− p.
If an individual is alive in his or her old age, he or she also has some probability of being in
poor health. The probability of an individual being in good health throughout his or her old
age is ψ ∈ (0, 1); the corresponding probability of poor health is 1− ψ. Therefore, there are
three different states in two periods of life: good health, poor health, and death.
A fraction pψ of young agents is of type g, whose parents have good health. Type b agents,
who constitute p(1 − ψ) of young agents, have parents who are in poor health. The fraction
1 − p of young agents are of type d, whose parents die. In addition, the fraction pψ of old
agents are of type g, who have good health. Type b agents, who constitute p(1 − ψ) of old
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agents, have poor health. The fraction 1 − p of old agents are of type d. We express the
death–illness status of each agent’s parents by using the index i; each agent’s own status is
indexed by j. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the probability of death and illness
status is not serially correlated across generation. Thus, the probabilities of the death–illness
states θs (s = i, j) are:
θs =

pψ if s = g,
p(1− ψ) if s = b,
(1− p) if s = d.
(1)
We assume that each old agent has the following household-produced health technology
and produces his or her own health by using his or her own time and that transferred by his
or her children:
hj ,t = dqi,tt+γ, j = g, b (2)
where d ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter such that d > 1 if j = g and d = 1 if j = b. In
addition, qi,tt represents care provision from type i children to parents, and γ represents the
productivity of old agents. Each old agent supplies one unit of time to produce household
health, although productivity is γ = γ ∈ (0, 1) if j = g; and γ = 0 if j = b, which is given
exogenously.
We assume that each agent of generation t ≥ 1, whose parents’ death–illness status is i,
has the following expected utility function:
maxUi
hi,t,ci,tt+1
≡ Eu(hi,t , ci,tt+1 , hj ,t+1 ; p, ψ)
= β lnhi,t + p[ci,tt+1+ψ lnhg,t+1 + (1− ψ) lnhb,t+1], i, j = g, b, d, (3)
where ci,tt+1 is the consumption of market goods during old age, and β ∈ (0, 1) measures the
degree of altruism towards parents. p and ψ are realized at the beginning of each period.
Because an agent is endowed with one unit of time, he or she allocates time to working in the
household on household-produced health, qi,tt, or to the market place producing market goods,
li,
t
t. A young agent earns wage income of wtli,
t
t by working for a firm, and saves all that wage
income for his or her old age. When old, an agent receives the proceeds of these savings and
allocates his or her endowed time to generating household-produced health. Following Yaari
(1965) and Blanchard (1985), we assume the existence of actuarially fair insurance companies.
These companies collect funds and invest them for firms. Returns on investments are repaid
to the insured household members who are still living. In other words, the contract offered
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by the insurance company redistributes income from the dead to the living. Suppose that the
insurance company collects et from each young agent (and thereby Et ≡ etNt in the aggregate)
in period t. (Note that old agents have no incentive to buy the annuity because they are not
alive in the subsequent period.) The company invests the funds for the firms and acquires
total proceeds of Rt+1Et in period t+1. Given that only pNt old people survive in period t+1,
each receives Rt+1et/p from the insurance company (because of perfect competition between
companies). Thus, the rate of return on the annuities is Rt+1/p for the living and 0 for those
who die at the end of period t. On the other hand, if young agents in period t invest et directly
for their firms, they receive Rt+1et whether they are alive or dead. (For agents who do not
live to the next period, their children inherit the funds.) Thus, the rate of return on self-
investment is Rt+1. Because we assume that households have no bequest motive, they accept
the insurance contract, which yields a higher interest rate than does self-investment. Thus,
the budget constraints of generation t, and their parents’ death–illness status i = g, b, d, are
ci,
t
t+1= Rt+1wtli,
t
t /p. By combining the time constraints li,
t
t+qi,
t
t= 1, we have the following
lifetime budget constraints:
ci,
t
t+1=
Rt+1
p
wt(1− qi,tt ), i = g, b, d (4)
In each period, the time spent working in the household on household-produced health or that
spent in the market place producing market goods must be nonnegative and must not exceed
unity, as follows.3
0 ≤ qi,tt≤ 1, and 0 ≤ li,tt≤ 1, i = g, b, d (5)
Taking Rt+1, wt, p, and ψ as given, each young agent maximizes the expected utility of (3)
subject to (2), (4), and (5). The optimal allocation is derived as follows.
qg,
t
t =

0 if dβγ ≤ Rt+1wt,
β
Rt+1wt
− γ
d
if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ ,
1 if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ ,
(6)
qb,
t
t =

β
Rt+1wt
if β ≤ Rt+1wt,
1 if Rt+1wt ≤ β
(7)
When Rt+1wt is sufficiently large, the opportunity cost of care provision becomes high; thus,
young agents reduce their care provision. If the parents of young agents die, agents derive no
3See Appendix A for derivation.
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Figure 1: The care provision
utility from the state of their aged parents’ health and, thus, we obtain:
qd,
t
t= 0. (8)
Figure 1 illustrates the relation of care provision.
Noting that dβ/(d + γ) < β < dβ/γ, we derive aggregate care provision by summing up
equations (6) to (8) and by using (1), as follows.
Qt ≡ qtNt =
∑
i=g,b,d
θiqi,
t
tNt
=

p
(
(1− ψ) β
Rt+1wt
)
Nt if dβγ ≤ Rt+1wt,
p
( β
Rt+1wt
− ψγ
d
)
Nt if β ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ ,
p
(
1− ψ + ψβ
Rt+1wt
− ψγ
d
)
Nt if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β,
pNt if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ
(9)
From (9), we find that, for a given level of Rt+1wt, aggregate care provision increases with life
expectancy p. From the resource constraints, we obtain the following aggregate labor supply.4
Lt ≡ ltNt =

(
1− pβ(1− ψ)
Rt+1wt
)
Nt if dβγ ≤ Rt+1wt,(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
Rt+1wt
)
Nt if β ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ ,(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)− pψβ
Rt+1wt
)
Nt if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β,
(1− p)Nt if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ
(10)
4Aggregate labor supply is derived as Lt ≡ ltNt = [pψ(1− qg,tt ) + p(1− ψ)(1− qb,tt ) + (1− p)(1− qd,tt )]Nt.
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Because young agents save all their wage income, aggregate savings are St ≡ stNt = wtltNt.
Dividing both sides by Nt yields the following savings functions.
st = wtlt
=

wt
(
1− pβ(1− ψ)
Rt+1wt
)
if dβγ ≤ Rt+1wt,
wt
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
Rt+1wt
)
if β ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ ,
wt
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)− pψβ
Rt+1wt
)
if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β,
wt(1− p) if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ
Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce output according to a Cobb–
Douglas production function of the form, Yt = AKαt (ltNt)
1−α, where Yt is aggregate output,
A > 0 is a productivity parameter, and Kt is the aggregate capital stock. The production
function can be rewritten in intensive form as yt = A(kt)α(lt)1−α, where kt ≡ Kt/Nt is the per
capita level of capital. We assume that capital depreciates fully in the process of production.
Given that firms are price takers, they take the wage wt and the real rental price of capital
Rt as given and then hire labor and capital so that their marginal products equal their factor
prices:
wt = (1− α)Ak˜αt , Rt = αAk˜α−1t , (11)
where k˜t ≡ kt/lt is the capital–labor ratio.
3 Equilibrium and Welfare
As a benchmark case, we first describe an economy in which there is no government. In Section
4, we analyze an economy in which there is public policy. We first derive equilibrium in the
goods market. The equilibrium condition for the capital market is given by Kt+1 = stNt =
wtltNt, which implies that the savings of young agents in generation t forms the aggregate
capital stock in period t + 1. Dividing both sides by Nt and using (11) yields the following
equilibrium condition for the capital market.
k˜t+1 =
(1− α)Ak˜αt lt
lt+1
(12)
In period 1, there are the young agents of generation 1 and the initial old agents of
generation 0. The initial old agents of generation 0 are endowed with k1 units of capital. Each
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old agent rents his or her capital to the insurance firms and earns an income of (R1/p)k1, which
is then consumed. The measure of initial old individuals is pN0 > 0. The utility obtained by
each individual in generation 0 is c01 + ψ lnhg,
0
1 + (1− ψ) lnhb,01.
Definition 1 The economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations and prices,
{{ci,tt , qi,tt , li,tt , si,tt }i=g,b,d, kt, yt, wt, rt}∞t=1, given the initial condition k1 = K1/N1 > 0, such
that all individual’s utility levels are maximized, firms’ profits are maximized, and all markets
are cleared.
By substituting (11) and (12) into (10), we obtain the following dynamics of labor supply
{lt}∞t=1.
l1−αt+1 =

pβ(1− ψ)l1−αt
αA(1− lt)[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
, if dβγ ≤ Rt+1wt < Regime I >
pβl1−αt
αA(1 + pψγd − lt)[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
, if β ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ < Regime II >
pψβl1−αt
αA[1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)− lt][(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
, if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β < Regime III >
(1− p)1−α, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ < Regime IV >
(13)
The following dynamics of the capital–labor ratio {k˜t}∞t=1 are obtained from (12) and (13).
k˜1−αt+1 =

αA(1− lt)(1− α)Ak˜αt
pβ(1− ψ) , if
dβ
γ ≤ Rt+1wt < Regime I >
αA(1 + pψγd − lt)(1− α)Ak˜αt
pβ
, if β ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ < Regime II >
αA[1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)− lt](1− α)Ak˜αt
pψβ
, if dβd+γ ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β < Regime III >(
(1− α)Ak˜αt
)1−α
, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβd+γ < Regime IV >
(14)
Before describing the equilibrium, we consider the border lines between the regimes. By
using (11), (12), and (14), we can express these border lines as follows.
(a) : dβγ = Rt+1wt
(a) : lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− pγ
d
(b) : β = Rt+1wt
(b) : lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− p
(c) : dβd+γ = Rt+1wt
(c) : lt = 1− p
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lt
k˜t
1
(a)
Regime I
(b)
Regime II
Regime III
Regime IV
(c)
Figure 2: The regime without LTC
These regimes are depicted in Figure 2.
Equations (13) and (14) characterize the economic equilibria that are represented by se-
quences of {k˜t, lt}∞t=1 and by the initial condition (k˜1, l1) > 0. We draw the phase diagram on
the (k˜t, lt) plane. The locus on the (k˜t, lt) plane representing k˜t+1 = k˜t is referred to as the
KK locus and the one representing lt+1 = lt is referred to as the LL locus. Given that the
minimum level of labor supply is 1− p, the KK and LL loci obtained from (13) and (14) are
as follows.
Regime I: 1 + pψγd − pγd ≤ lt
LL1 : lt = 1− pβ(1− ψ)
αA{(1− α)Ak˜αt }α
,
KK1 : k˜t =
(
(1− α)AαA(1− lt)
pβ(1− ψ)
) 1
1−2α
The LL1 and KK1 loci intersect border line (a) at the All and Akk, respectively, where: All ≡
(k˜t, lt) = ([( βdγαA)
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , 1+ pψγd − pγd ) and Akk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([ (1−α)AαAγβd ]
1
1−2α , 1+ pψγd − pγd ).
These loci in Regime I are depicted in Figure 3.
Regime II: 1 + pψγd − p ≤ lt ≤ 1 + pψγd − pγd
LL2 : lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
αA[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
,
KK2 : k˜t =
(
(1− α)AαA(1 + pψγd − lt)
pβ
) 1
1−2α
The LL2 and KK2 loci intersect border line (a) at points All and Akk, respectively, and inter-
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lt
k˜t
1
(a)
Regime IKK1 LL1
Akk A
ll
Figure 3: The relationship in Regime I
lt
k˜t
1
(b)
Regime II
(c)
KK2 LL2
Akk All
BkkBll
Figure 4: The relationship in Regime II
sect border line (b) at pointsBll andBkk, respectively, whereBll ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([( βαA)
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , 1+
pψγ
d −p) and Bkk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([ (1−α)AαAβ ]
1
1−2α , 1+ pψγd −p). These loci in Regime II are depicted
in Figure 4.
Regime III: 1− p ≤ lt ≤ 1 + pψγd − p
LL3 : lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)− pψβ
αA[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
,
KK3 : k˜t =
(
(1− α)AαA[1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)− lt]
pψβ
) 1
1−2α
The LL3 and KK3 loci intersect border line (b) at points Bll and Bkk, respectively, and inter-
sect border line (c) at points C ll and Ckk, respectively, where C ll ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([( βγαA(d+γ))
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , 1−
p), and Ckk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([ (1−α)AαA(1+γ)β ]
1
1−2α , 1− p). These loci in Regime III are depicted in
Figure 5.
Regime IV: lt ≤ 1− p
LL4 : lt = 1− p
KK4 : k˜t = ((1− α)A)
1
1−α
The LL4 and KK4 loci intersect border line (c) at points C ll and Ckk, respectively. These
loci in Regime IV are depicted in Figure 6.
For analytical simplicity, we assume the following.
Assumption 1 α <
1
2
Assumption 2 A ≡
(
β
α
)1−α(
1
1−α
)α
< A <
(
βd
γα
)1−α(
1
1−α
)α ≡ A¯
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lt
k˜t
1
(c) Regime III
(b)
LL3 KK3
Bkk Bll
CkkC ll
Figure 5: The relationship in Regime III
lt
k˜t
1
(d)
Regime IV
LL4
KK4
C ll Ckk
Figure 6: The relationship in Regime IV
Assumption 1 implies that the KK locus is decreasing in l. Assumption 2 implies that the
KK and LL loci intersect in Regime II, where each agent adopts an interior solution to the
problem of care provision to aged parents.5 Figure 7 summarizes Figures 3 to 6 and represents
the phase diagram for this economy.
The initial point from which the economy starts can be derived from the following.
l1 =
k1
k˜1
(15)
The surface representing (15) can be drawn in (kt, lt) space because the initial per capita
capital stock, k1 ≡ K1/N1, is given exogenously. Therefore, the economy must initially be on
the curve (15). As (15) confirms, the contours of (15) when drawn on the (kt, lt) plane are
downward sloping.
For later reference, we first consider the case in which the initial level of capital is suffi-
ciently large. In this case, the initial contour is drawn in the upper-right corner of Figure 7,
and the trajectory is drawn as J . Because any trajectory that is above J does not satisfy
the time constraints (see (5)), we can exclude these trajectories as potential equilibria. Thus,
contour J represents the boundary trajectory of this economy.
Next, we consider, for example, the case in which l1 = K1/k1N1 in Figure 7. If the
economy initially happens to be on the SS line, it converges to E2. Given Assumption 2, this
equilibrium is located in Regime II.
When the economy initially happens to be above the SS line, at point G for example, in
Figure 7, the initial level of capital is sufficiently high and, thus, so is the opportunity cost of
care provision. In the economy, both labor supply and the capital–labor ratio initially increase.
5See Appendix B for the derivation of Assumption 1 and Assumption 2.
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lt
k˜t
1
((1− α)A) 11−α
1− p
G
G′
E1
E2
E3
SS
I
I ′
I”
LL
KK
l1 = k1k˜1
J
Figure 7: Phase diagram analysis
However, when the KK locus is crossed at point G′ in Figure 7, the increases in labor supply
leads to a decrease in the capital–labor ratio, k˜t. Because the boundary trajectory of this
economy is J , it follows that the trajectory for this regime converges to E1. Assumption 2 is
not satisfied by the equilibrium E1, thus, we exclude it as a potential equilibrium.
When the economy initially happens to be below the SS line, at point I, for example, in
Figure 7, the initial level of capital is sufficiently low and, thus, so is the opportunity cost
of care provision. In the economy, both labor supply and the capital–labor ratio initially
increase. However, when the LL locus is crossed at point I ′ in Figure 7, the increase in the
capital stock leads to a decrease in labor supply, lt. When the trajectory reaches point I ′′
in Figure 7, where labor supply is at its lowest, the capital–labor ratio falls and approaches
E3. Assumption 2 does not satisfied by the equilibrium E3, thus, we exclude it as a potential
equilibrium.
The following proposition shows the equilibrium of the economy in the absence of a gov-
ernment. Stability is discussed in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The steady state of the economy in the absence of a government is derived as
12
follows:
(k˜∗2, l
∗
2) =
(
((1− α)A) 11−α , 1 + pψγ
d
− pβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
)
Proof. See Appendix C.
From Proposition 1, we have the steady-state level of the capital stock k∗ = l∗k˜∗. From
(4), (6), (7), and (11), the steady-state levels of consumption cj ,tt+1, care provision to aged
parents qi,tt, and factor prices wt and Rt depend on the steady-state level of the capital stock.
The steady-state level of the capital stock depends on the parameters A, p, ψ, and β. We
examine how these parameters affect the steady-state level of the capital stock. The following
proposition shows comparative static results for the steady-state level of the capital stock.
Proposition 2
(a) :
∂k∗2
∂p
< 0 (b) :
∂k∗2
∂β
< 0, (c) :
∂k∗2
∂ψ
> 0, (d) :
∂k∗2
∂A
> 0.
Proof. (i) Because k∗2 ≡ k˜∗l∗ = (1 + pψγd )
1
1−α ((1 − α)A) 11−α − pβ(1−α)α , thus
∂k∗2
∂p =
ψγ
d ((1 −
α)A)
α
1−ααA − β(1−α)α > (<)0, if and only if A > (<)( βdαγ )1−α( 11−α)α( 1ψ )1−α ≡ Aˇ. Under the
Assumption 2, because A¯ < Aˇ, only the A < Aˇ is effective. Thus we have ∂k
∗
2
∂p < 0.
What is interesting about Proposition 2 is that the comparative static effects of life ex-
pectancy on the steady-state level of the capital stock. There are two effects of life expectancy
on the steady-state level of the capital stock. One is the ‘demographic effect’, which oper-
ates through aggregate care provision to aged parents. Because aggregate care provision for
household-produced health is formalized as Qt ≡ qtNt =
∑
i=g,b,d θiqi,
t
tNt, care provision in-
creases with life expectancy p, therefore, a rise in life expectancy lowers aggregate labor supply
and savings. Therefore, the demographic effect on the steady-state level of the capital stock
is negative. The other effect is the ‘time preference effect’. The interest rate is an increasing
function of life expectancy p; thus, an increase in life expectancy can be interpreted as the
rate of time preference, as incorporated in models such as those of Yaari (1965) and Blanchard
(1985).6 Therefore, an increase in life expectancy lowers each agent’s rate of time preference
6By using equations (11) and (12), the rate of interest in Regime II can be rewritten as:
Rt+1 =
pβ
(1 + pψγ
d
− lt)(1− α)Akαt
.
Differentiating this with respect to life expectancy p, we have:
∂Rt+1
∂p
=
β(1− α)Akαt
{(1 + pψγ
d
− lt)(1− α)Akαt }2
(1− lt) > 0.
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and increases savings. Under Assumption 2, the negative demographic effect outweighs the
positive time preference effect and, thus, an increase in life expectancy lowers the steady-state
level of the capital stock.
In addition to the preceding analysis of life expectancy, it is worth determining the effects
of illness status. Because the care provision of type b agents is higher than that of type g
agents, an increase in the fraction of people with good health status, ψ, reduces aggregate
care provision. Thus, the steady-state level of the capital stock increases when the proportion
of those with good health status increases.
4 Public Long-term Care Policy
In the preceding sections, we described the economy that prevail when there is no government.
In this section, we introduce a government that provides public long-term care policy, that is,
LTC, to agents who have poor health in their old age.
We assume that LTC is implemented as follows. First, the government levies a payroll
tax τ on young agents (generation t). Second, the government employs each young agent’s
(generation t) time zi,tt and transfers time zˆt to old agents (generation t − 1) who have poor
health. When old agents supply their one unit of time to the production of household health
status, type g agents have a productivity level of γ > 1, whereas type b agents do not. Thus,
LTC complements the productivity of type b old agents by providing zˆt ≤ γ/d units of public
care provision to those agents.
Because each young agent supplies zi,tt time to the public care market in an economy
with LTC, aggregate public care provision Zt is determined as Zt ≡ ztNt =
∑
i=g,b,d θizi,
t
tNt.
Aggregate public care provision is divided among old agents who have poor health. Thus, an
old agent who has poor health can receive an amount of public care provision of zˆt = zt/p(1−ψ)
through LTC.
Government collects payroll taxes from young workers who work in the market place and
in the public care market, and then repays these revenues to young agents who work in the
public care market. For analytical simplicity, we assume that perfect substitution prevails
between the labor market and the public care market, that is, the wage rates are equalized in
both markets. Thus we have the following budget constraint.
τ(lt + zt)wt = ztwt (16)
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The left-hand side represents aggregate tax income collected by the government. The right-
hand side represents aggregate expenditure on the public care provision.
Given that the government transfers time to old agents (generation t− 1) so that a type b
old agent (of generation t− 1) can be provided with public care and so that a young agent (of
generation t) can transfer his or her time to the public care market, the household produced-
health technology function of type b old agents and the budget constraints of young agents
can be rewritten as follows.
hb,t= qb,tt+zˆt, (17)
li,
t
t+qi,
t
t+zi,
t
t= 1, i = g, b, d, (18)
ci,
t
t+1=
Rt+1
p
(1− τ)wt(li,tt+zi,tt ), i = g, b, d, (19)
0 ≤ qi,tt≤ 1, 0 ≤ li,tt≤ 1, 0 ≤ zi,tt≤ 1, i = g, b, d (20)
We obtain the lifetime budget constraint from (20) and (19) as follows.
ci,
t
t+1=
Rt+1
p
(1− τ)wt(1− qi,tt ), i = g, b, d (21)
Taking Rt+1, wt, τ, zˆt, p and ψ as given, each young agent whose parents’ death–illness
status is i = g (or i = b) maximize (3) subject to (2) (or (17)), (20), and (21). Solving this
problem by using a similar method to that used in Section 2, we can describe the optimal
allocation as follows.
qg,
t
t =

0 if dβγ(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt,
β
Rt+1wt(1− τ) −
γ
d
if dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ dβγ(1−τ) ,
1 if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ,
(22)
qb,
t
t =

0 if βzˆt(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt,
β
Rt+1wt(1− τ) − zˆt if
β
(1+zˆt)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤
β
zˆt(1−τ) ,
1 if Rt+1wt ≤ β(1+zˆt)(1−τ)
(23)
If the parents of young agents die, the agents derive no utility from the state of their aged
parents’ health, thus, we obtain:
qd,
t
t= 0. (24)
When
τ <
zt
p(1− ψ) + zt ,
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Figure 8: The care provision with LTC
the care provision of type g young agents increases when there is LTC, though that of type
b young agents decreases. The borderline in Figure 8 shows the level of care provision for an
economy in which there is LTC; the solid line corresponds to an economy that has no LTC.
Noting that zˆt ≤ γ/d, aggregate private care provision is derived by summing up (22) to (24)
and by using (1) as follows.
Qt ≡ qtNt =
∑
i=g,b,d
θiqi,
t
tNt
=

0, if βzˆt(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt,
p
( β(1− ψ)
Rt+1wt(1− τ) − (1− ψ)zˆt
)
Nt, if dβγ(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ βzˆt(1−τ) ,
p
( β
Rt+1wt(1− τ) −
ψγ
d
− (1− ψ)zˆt
)
Nt, if β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤
dβ
γ(1−τ) ,
p
( ψβ
Rt+1wt(1− τ) + 1− ψ −
ψγ
d
)
Nt, if dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β(1−τ)(1+zˆt) ,
pNt, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τ)
(25)
From (20) and (25), we obtain the following aggregate labor supply.7
Lt = ltNt =

(1− zt)Nt, if βzˆt(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt,(
1− pβ(1− ψ)
Rt+1wt(1− τ)
)
Nt, if dβγ(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ βzˆt(1−τ) ,(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
Rt+1wt(1− τ)
)
Nt, if β(1−τ)(1+zˆt) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤
dβ
γ(1−τ) ,(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)− zt − pψβ
Rt+1wt(1− τ)
)
Nt, if dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β(1−τ)(1+zˆt) ,
(1− p)(1− zt1−p)Nt, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τt)
(26)
7Aggregate labor supply is derived as Lt ≡ ltNt = [pψ(1− qg,tt−zg,tt )+p(1−ψ)(1− qb,tt−zb,tt )+(1−p)(1−
zd,
t
t )]Nt. When Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) , public care supply of type g and type b agents zg,tt= zb,tt= 0. Thus,
aggregate labor supply is derived as Lt ≡ ltNt = (1− p)(1− zd,tt ) = (1− p)(1− zt1−p ).
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4.1 Equilibrium with LTC
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium that prevails when there is LTC. To find the
equilibrium, we examine the equilibrium condition for the capital market. The savings of
young agents form the aggregate capital stock in period t+1, and are thus derived as Kt+1 =
st = (1 − τ)wt(lt + zt)Nt. Dividing both sides by Nt and substituting zt = τ lt/(1 − τ) into
this equilibrium condition (see (16)) yields the following equilibrium condition for the capital
market.
k˜t+1 = (1− α)Ak˜αt
lt
lt+1
(27)
Noting that zt = τ lt/(1 − τ), we obtain the following dynamics for labor supply {lt}∞t+1 by
using (11), (26), and (27).
l1−αt+1 =

(1− τ)1−α, if βzˆt(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt < Regime I >,
pβ(1− ψ)l1−αt
αA{(1− α)Ak˜αt }α(1− lt)(1− τ)
if dβγ(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ βzˆt(1−τ) < Regime II >
pβl1−αt
αA{(1− α)Ak˜αt }α(1 + pψγd − lt)(1− τ)
,
if β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤
dβ
γ(1−τ) < Regime III >
pψβl1−αt
αA{(1− α)Ak˜αt }α[{1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)}(1− τ)− lt]
if dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) < Regime IV >
((1− τ)(1− p))1−α, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) < Regime V >
(28)
We obtain a sequence for the capital–labor ratio {k˜t}∞t=1 by using (27) and (28), as follows.
k˜1−αt+1 =

(
(1− α)Ak˜αt
)1−α
, if βzˆt(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt, < Regime I >
(1− α)Ak˜αt αA(1− τ)(1− lt)
pβ(1− ψ) ,
if dβγ(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ βzˆt(1−τ) < Regime II >
(1− α)Ak˜αt αA(1− τ)(1 + pψγd − lt)
pβ
,
if β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤
dβ
γ(1−τ) < Regime III >
(1− α)Ak˜αt αA{[1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)](1− τ)− lt}
pψβ
,
if dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) ≤ Rt+1wt ≤ β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) < Regime IV >(
(1− α)Ak˜αt
)1−α
, if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) < Regime V >
(29)
Before describing the equilibrium, we examine the above border lines in a similar way to
that used in Section 3. The border lines can be rewritten as follows.
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Figure 9: The regime with LTC
(a) : βzˆt(1−τ) = Rt+1wt
lt = 1− τ,
(b) : dβγ(1−τ) = Rt+1wt
lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− pγ
d
,
(c) : β(1+zˆt)(1−τ) = Rt+1wt
lt =
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p
)((1− ψ)(1− τ)
1− ψ(1− τ)
)
,
(d) : dβ(d+γ)(1−τ) = Rt+1wt
lt = (1− p)(1− τ)
The above five regimes are depicted in Figure 9.
Equations (28) and (29) define economic equilibria that are represented by sequences of
{k˜t, lt}∞t=1 and by the initial condition that (k˜1, l1) > 0. We refer to the locus on the (k˜t, lt)
plane that represents k˜t+1 = k˜t as the KK locus and refer to that representing lt+1 = lt as
the LL locus. Noting that the minimum level of labor supply is (1 − p)(1 − τ), and noting
that the maximum level of labor supply is 1− τ , equations (28) and (29) imply the following
KK and LL loci.
Regime I: 1− τ ≤ lt
LL1 : lt = 1− τ,
KK1 : k˜t = ((1− α)A)
1
1−α
18
The LL1 andKK1 loci intersect border line (a) at points All and Akk, respectively, where All ≡
(k˜t, lt) = ([(
pβ(1−ψ)
ταA(1−τ))
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , 1− τ), and Akk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = (( (1−α)AαA(1−τ)τpβ(1−ψ) )
1
1−2α , 1− τ).
Regime II: 1 + pψγd − pγd ≤ lt ≤ 1− τ
LL2 : lt = 1− pβ(1− ψ)
αA[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α(1− τ)
,
KK2 : k˜t =
(((1− α)AαA(1− τ)
pβ(1− ψ)
)
(1− lt)
) 1
1−2α
The LL2 and KK2 loci intersect border line (a) at points All and Akk, respectively. The LL2
andKK2 loci intersect border line (b) at pointsBll andBkk, respectively, whereBll ≡ (k˜t, lt) =
([( βdγαA(1−τ))
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , 1+ pψγd − pγd ), and Bkk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = (( (1−α)AαA(1−τ)γβd )
1
1−2α , 1+ pψγd − pγd ).
Regime III: (1 + pψγd − p)( (1−ψ)(1−τ)1−ψ(1−τ) ) ≤ lt ≤ 1 + pψγd − pγd
LL3 : lt = 1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
αA[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α(1− τ)
,
KK3 : k˜ =
(((1− α)AαA(1− τ)
pβ
)(
1 +
pψγ
d
− lt
)) 11−2α
The LL3 and KK3 loci intersect border line (b) at points Bll and Bkk, respectively. The
LL3 and KK3 loci intersect border line (c) at points C ll and Ckk, respectively, where C ll ≡
(k˜t, lt) = ([{ pβ(1−ψ+ψτ)
αA(1−τ)[τ(1+ pψγ
d
)+p(1−ψ)(1−τ)]}
1
α
1
(1−α)A ]
1
α , (1 + pψγd − p)( (1−ψ)(1−τ)1−ψ(1−τ) )), and Ckk ≡
(k˜t, lt) = ({ (1−α)AαA(1−τ)[τ(1+
pψγ
d
)+p(1−ψ)(1−τ)]
pβ(1−ψ+ψτ) }
1
1−2α , (1 + pψγd − p)( (1−ψ)(1−τ)1−ψ(1−τ) )).
Regime IV: (1− p)(1− τ) ≤ lt ≤ (1 + pψγd − p)( (1−ψ)(1−τ)1−ψ(1−τ) )
LL4 : lt =
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)
)
(1− τ)− pψβ
αA[(1− α)Ak˜αt ]α
,
KK4 : k˜ =
(((1− α)AαA
pψβ
)(
1 +
pψγ
d
− p(1− ψ)
)
(1− τ)− lt
) 1
1−2α
The LL4 and KK4 loci intersect border line (c) at points C ll and Ckk, respectively. The
LL4 and KK4 loci intersect border line (d) at points Dll and Dkk, respectively, where Dll ≡
(k˜t, lt) = ([ βαA(1+ γ
d
)(1−τ))
1
α ( 1(1−α)A)]
1
α , (1−p)(1−τ)), andDkk ≡ (k˜t, lt) = ([ (1−α)AαA(1−τ)(1+
γ
d
)
β ]
1
1−2α , (1−
p)(1− τ)).
Regime V : lt ≤ (1− p)(1− τ)
LL5 : lt+1 = (1− τ)(1− p)
KK5 : k˜t = ((1− α)A)
1
1−α
The LL5 and KK5 loci intersect border line (d) at the points Dll and Dkk, respectively.
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Figure 10: The dynamics of an economy with LTC
The noteworthy feature of the economy with LTC is its equilibrium dynamics. As shown
in Section 3.1, an economy that initially happens to be above the SS line (for example, at
point G in Figure 7), the economy converges to the point in which the capital labor ratio k˜t
is zero. However, in an economy with LTC, the level of labor supply to firms is limited to
1− τ . Therefore, when the economic regime is one in which labor supply is at its highest, the
capital stock increases and approaches E1 in the long run.
Therefore, for a given initial condition, the economy converges to E1, E2, or E3 (see
Figure 10) in the long run. From Assumption 2, E2 is in Regime III.8 The equilibria E1 and
E3 does not satisfied under Assumption 2, thus the following Proposition shows the steady
state equilibrium of the economy with LTC.
Proposition 3 The steady state of the economy with LTC is as follows:
(k˜∗2, l
∗
2) =
(
((1− α)A) 11−α , 1 + pψγ
d
− pβ
αA((1− α)A(1− τ)) α1−α
)
We are also interested in whether LTC has a positive impact on the steady-state level of
the capital stock. At the economy with LTC, young agents must provide time to public care
provision, thus, the aggregate labor supply decreases.
8This proof is given by Appendix D.
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Figure 11: A comparison of the dynamics of economies with and without LTC
An decrease in labor supply shifts both the KK and LL lines downwards, as shown in
Figure 11. Therefore, the steady-state level of the capital stock decreases in an economy with
LTC.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine the welfare impact of LTC. To do so, we compare the steady-state
levels of welfare in economies without LTC (in which τ = 0) and with LTC (in which τ > 0).
Because it is difficult to analyze the allocation, we limit our attention to the steady state
in the rest of this section. We define the steady-state level of welfare as the sum of agents’
lifetime utilities, which are given by (3). This sum is formulated as follows:
W =
∑
i=g,b,d
θiui
= pψ(1 + β) lnhg + p(1− ψ)(1 + β) lnhb + pc, (30)
where hg, hb, and c = Σj=g,b,dθjcj , respectively, represent the steady-state levels of the health
status of agents s = g, b (s = i, j), and the steady-state levels of aggregate consumption.
To facilitate comparison, we denote the steady-state level of welfare at the economy without
LTC as W c and the economy with LTC as W s. W c is measured by substituting the steady-
state values of lnhg = ln{ dβ
αA((1−α)A) α1−α
}, lnhb = ln{ β
αA((1−α)A) α1−α
} and c = 1p [αA((1 −
21
α)A)
α
1−α (1+pψγd )− pβ] into (30).9
W c = p(1+β) ln
{
dψβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
}
+αA((1−α)A) α1−α
[(
1 +
pψγ
d
)
− pβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
]
Given that lnhg = ln{ dβ
αA((1−α)A) α1−α (1−τ)
}, lnhb = ln{ β
αA((1−α)A) α1−α (1−τ)
}, and c =
1
p [αA((1− α)A)
α
1−α (1 + pψγd − pβαA((1−α)A) α1−α (1−τ))]
10, W s is measured as follows.
W s = p(1 + β) ln
{ dψβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α (1− τ)
}
+ αA((1− α)A) α1−α
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α (1− τ)
)
.
To determine the benefit (or harm) of LTC, we subtract W s from W c, as follows.
W c −W s = p
[
(1 + β) ln{1− τ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+β
τ
1− τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
(31)
Noting that W c −W s is a linear function of p, and noting that W c −W s = 0 when p = 0,
the term inside the braces in (31) determines the value of W c−W s. Differentiating W c−W s
with respect to τ yields
∂(W c −W s)
∂τ
=
1
1− τ (−(1− τ − βτ))
{
< 0 if τ ∈ (0, 11+β ),
> 0 if τ ∈ ( 11+β , 0).
(32)
Defining the term inside the braces in (31) as ∆(τ) ≡ (1 + β) ln(1 − τ) + βτ1−τ , implies that
∆(0) = 0 and ∆(1)→∞. From these results and from (32), we find that there exists a unique
τ∗ ∈ ( 11+β , 1), such that δ(τ) = 0. Figure 12 illustrates this relationship.
Therefore, we can state the following.
W c −W s
{
< 0 for τ ∈ (0, τ∗),
> 0 for τ ∈ (τ∗, 1)
The welfare gain (or loss) that arises in an economy with LTC (in which τ > 0) can be
interpreted as comprising a ‘health status effect’, a ‘capital stock effect’, and a ‘subsidy effect’.
The health status effect is represented by the first term on the right-hand side of (31). The
steady-state level of health status improves when LTC is introduced and, thus, a negative
value in (31) would be obtained. LTC also has a capital stock effect on welfare. Because LTC
implies a lower steady-state level of the capital stock, it leads to lower steady-state levels of
9See Appendix E for the derivation of the steady-state values.
10See also Appendix E for the derivation of the steady-state values.
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Figure 12: The relationship between W c and W s
income and welfare. This effect is represented by the second term on the right-hand side of
(31). In addition to these two effects, we have the subsidy effect on welfare. Because old agents
can receive public care provision without paying tax, this effect improves the steady-state level
of welfare of old agents.
When the tax rate is low, the negative health status and subsidy effects dominate the
positive capital stock effect. However, when the tax rate is sufficiently high, labor supply falls
in the economy with LTC. Consequently, LTC has a larger positive effect on the capital stock.
Thus, the positive capital stock effect outweighs the negative health status and subsidy effects.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, our aim was to analyze the impact of intergenerational transfers of time from
children to their aged parents on the capital stock and welfare in an aging population. To
examine these issues, we used a two-period overlapping generations model that incorporated
uncertainties about lifespan and health status in old age. In addition to this, we assume that
(i) young agents derive utility from their aged parents’ health status; (ii) household health
status is produced by using time; and (iii) intergenerational transfers of time, that is, providing
care to aged parents, are modeled by allowing young agents to participate in the production
of household health status.
Using this model, we first described an economy in which there is no government. We
showed that life expectancy has a negative impact on the steady-state level of the capital
stock. On the other hand, an increase in the proportion of healthier old agents increases the
steady-state level of the capital stock.
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In the second part of the paper, we studied the role and the effect of public long term care
policy, that is, LTC. We showed that LTC lowers the steady-state level of the capital stock.
However, when the tax rate is small, LTC enhances welfare.
Appendix
Appendix A: Utility maximization problem
Let λ1 be the nonnegative multipliers associated with the constraints (4). The optimal solution
is obtained by setting up the following Lagrangian function.
£ = pψ
[
β ln(dqg,tt+γ) + p{cg,tt+1+ψ ln(dqg,t+1t+1+γ) + (1− ψ) ln qb,t+1t+1 }
]
+ p(1− ψ)
[
β ln(qb,tt ) + p{cb,tt+1+ψ ln(dqg,t+1t+1+γ) + (1− ψ) ln qb,t+1t+1 }
]
+ (1− p)
[
p{cd,tt+1+ψ ln(dqg,t+1t+1+γ) + (1− ψ) ln qb,t+1t+1 }
]
+ λ1
[
pψ
{Rt+1
p
wt(1− qg,tt )− cg,tt+1
}
+ p(1− ψ)
{Rt+1
p
wt(1− qb,tt )− cb,tt+1
}
+ (1− p)
(Rt+1
p
wt − cd,tt+1
)]
+ λ2(1− qg,tt ) + λ3qg,tt+λ4(1− qb,tt )
Then, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions below, together with (2), (4), and (5), are necessary and
sufficient for the maximization problem. Because young agents are categorized based on their
parents’ death–illness status (i = g, b, d), we derive each type of agent’s utility maximization
problem.
<The young agent whose parents’ death–illness status is i = g >
p− λ1 ≤ 0 with equality if cg,tt+1> 0 (33)
βd
dqg,tt+γ
− λ1Rt+1
p
wt − λ2 + λ3 ≤ 0 with equality if qg,tt> 0 (34)
λ1pψ
(Rt+1
p
wt(1− qg,tt )− cg,tt+1
)
= 0 (35)
λ2(1− qg,tt ) = 0 (36)
λ3qg,
t
t= 0 (37)
Because (33) can be rewritten as 0 < p ≤ λ1, λ1 takes a positive value. Noting that pψ > 0,
(35) can be rewritten as follows.
Rt+1
p
wt(1− qg,tt ) = cg,tt+1 (38)
The solution is found by using a ‘guess-and-verify’ method.
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The first guess is that qg,tt= 1. From (38), cg,
t
t+1= 0, and from (36) and (37), λ2 > 0
and λ3 = 0. Because qg,tt> 0, we have dβ/(d+ γ) = λ1Rt+1wt/p+ λ2 from (34). Given that
λ1 ≥ p and λ2 ≥ 0, this last equation can be rewritten as Rt+1wt ≤ dβ/(d+ γ). Thus, if and
only if Rt+1wt ≤ dβ/(d+ γ), the guess qg,tt= 1 is correct and cg,tt+1= 0.
The next guess is that qg,tt ∈ (0, 1). From (38), cg,tt+1> 0, then λ1 = p > 0 from (33).
(36) and (37) imply that λ2 = λ3 = 0, then we have qg,tt= β/Rt+1wt − γ/d from (34). Given
that qb,tt> 0, this last condition can be rewritten as Rt+1wt < dβ/γ. Thus, if and only if
Rt+1wt < dβ/γ, the guess qg,tt ∈ (0, 1) is correct.
The final guess is that qg,tt= 0. From (36), (37), and (38), λ2 = 0, λ3 > 0, and cg,
t
t+1=
Rt+1wt/p. Substituting these values into (34), we have βd/γ ≤ Rt+1wt. Thus, if and only if
βd/γ ≤ Rt+1wt, the guess qb,tt= 0 correct.
<The young agent whose parents’ death–illness status is i = b >
p− λ1 ≤ 0 with equality if cb,tt+1> 0 (39)
β
qb,
t
t
− λ1Rt+1
p
wt − λ4 = 0 (40)
λ1p(1− ψ)
(Rt+1
p
wt(1− qb,tt )− cb,tt+1
)
= 0 (41)
λ4(1− qb,tt ) = 0 (42)
Because (39) can be rewritten as 0 < p ≤ λ1, λ1 takes a positive value. Noting that pψ > 0,
(41) can be rewritten as follows.
Rt+1
p
wt(1− qb,tt ) = cb,tt+1 (43)
The solution is found by using the guess-and-verify method.
The first guess is that qb,tt= 1. From (41),(39) and (42), we have cb,
t
t+1= 0, λ1 ≥ p
andλ4 ≥ 0, respectively. Because qb,tt> 0, we have β = λ1Rt+1wt/p + λ4 from (40). Given
that λ1 ≥ p and λ2 ≥ 0, this last equation can be rewritten as Rt+1wt ≤ β. Thus, if and only
if Rt+1wt < β, the guess qb,tt= 1 is correct.
The next guess is that qb,tt ∈ (0, 1). (43) imply that cb,tt+1> 0, then we have p = λ1 and
λ4 = 0 from (39) and (42). Substituting these values into (41), we have qb,tt= β/Rt+1wt.
Thus, if and only if 0 < Rt+1wt < βd/γ, the guess is correct and qb,tt= β/Rt+1wt.
Appendix B: The derivation of Assumption 1 and Assumption 2
In this appendix, we assume that certain conditions are satisfied in order to derive the equi-
librium.
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<The derivation of Assumption 1>
We first assume that KK locus is decreasing in lt. To derive this condition, we differentiate
the KK locus with respect to lt.
KK1 :
∂k˜t
∂lt
= − 1
1− 2α
((1− α)AαA(1− lt)
pβ(1− ψ)
) 2α
1−2α
,
KK2 :
∂k˜t
∂lt
= − 1
1− 2α
((1− α)AαA(1 + pψγd − lt)
pβ(1− ψ)
) 2α
1−2α
,
KK3 :
∂k˜t
∂lt
= − 1
1− 2α
((1− α)AαA{1 + pψγd − p(1− ψ)− lt}
pβ(1− ψ)
) 2α
1−2α
These results show that if α < 1/2, each KK locus is decreasing in lt.
<The derivaion of Assumption 2>
Next, we assume that the equilibrium of the economy is determined under a regime in which
each agent adopts an interior solution to the problem of care provision. That is, we assume
that the economy is under Regime II. When Akk < All and Bll < Bkk hold simultaneously,
the equilibrium falls under Regime II (see Figure 4). Thus, we derive the following condition.
Supposing that Akk < All, we have A < ( βdγα)
1−α( 11−α)
α. Supposing that Bll < Bkk, we have
(βα)
1−α( 11−α)
α < A. Therefore, when A ≡ (βα)1−α( 11−α)α < A < ( βdγα)1−α( 11−α)α ≡ A¯, the
equilibrium falls under Regime II.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we demonstrate the stability of the steady state.
The dynamics of E3 are derived as k˜t+1 = (1 − α)Ak˜αt . Given that α < 1, the stability
of E3 is straightforward. We examine the local dynamics of E2. We take a first-order Taylor
expansion of the system around the steady state (k˜∗, l∗). By letting kˇt ≡ kt−k∗ and lˇt ≡ l˜t− l˜∗,
this linearization can be expressed as:
(
kˇt+1
lˇt+1
)
=

α
(1− α) −
αA
pβ
· ((1− α)A)
1+α
1−α
1− α
− l
∗α2
(1− α)((1− α)A) 11−α
1 +
((1− α)A) α1−α l∗αA
(1− α)pβ

(
kˇt
lˇt
)
,
where l∗ ≡ 1+ pψγd − pβαA((1−α)A) α1−α . Letting κ be the eigenvalue, the characteristic polynomial
is as follows.
P (κ) = κ2 − Tκ+D,
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T =
α
1− α + 1 +
((1− α)A) α1−α l∗αA
(1− α)pβ ,
D =
α
1− α +
α
(1− α) ·
((1− α)A) α1−α l∗αA
pβ
Azariadis (1993) shows that the steady state is a saddle, when 1−T +D < 0 holds. It is clear
that
1− T +D = −((1− α)A)
α
1−α l∗αA
pβ
< 0.
Therefore, E2 is a saddle point.
Appendix D
When Bkk < Bll and Ckk < C ll hold simultaneously, the equilibrium with LTC is un-
der Regime III. To derive this condition, we first assume that Bkk < Bll. Solving this,
we have A < ( dβγα(1−τ))
1−α( 11−α)
α ≡ Aˆ. Next, assuming that Ckk < C ll, we have Aˇ ≡
( pβ(1−ψ)[p(1−ψ)+τ ](1−τ)α)
1−α( 11−α)
α < A. Because Aˆ < A¯ and Aˇ < A, it follows that, given Assump-
tion 1-(ii), the equilibrium with LTC is under Regime III.
Appendix E
To derive the steady-state level of welfare, in this appendix, we derive the steady-state values
of care provision and consumption.
<The derivation of steady state value in the absence of a government>
Because the equilibrium E2 is located in Regime II, each value is derived by substituting
in the steady-state levels of the following values.
hg = dqg + γ = d
( β
Rw
− γ
d
)
+ γ =
dβ
Rw
,
hb = qb =
β
Rw
,
c = pψcg + p(1− ψ)cb + (1− p)cd,
= pψ
(Rw
p
(
1− β
Rw
+
γ
d
))
+ p(1− ψ)Rw
p
(
1− β
Rw
)
+ (1− p)Rw
p
(1),
=
Rw
p
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
Rw
)
Substituting the steady-state values into Rw = αAk˜α−1(1 − α)Ak˜α, yields Rw = αA((1 −
α)A)
α
1−α . Therefore, each steady-state level is determined as follows.
hg =
dβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
, hb =
β
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
, and c =
1
p
[
αA((1−α)A α1−α
(
1+
pψγ
d
)
−pβ
]
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<The derivation of the steady state value when there is LTC>
To derive the steady-state level of welfare when there is LTC, we derive the steady-state
values of care provision and consumption. Because the equilibrium E2 is located in Regime III,
each value is derived by substituting the steady-state values into each constraint, as follows.
hg = dqg + γ = d
( β
Rw(1− τ) −
γ
d
)
+ γ =
dβ
Rw(1− τ) ,
hb = qb + zˆ =
β
Rw(1− τ) ,
c = pψcg + p(1− ψ)cb + (1− p)cd,
= pψ
(Rw(1− τ)
p
(
1− β
Rw(1− τ) +
γ
d
))
+ p(1− ψ)Rw(1− τ)
p
(
1− β
Rw(1− τ) + zˆ
)
+ (1− p)Rw(1− τ)
p
(1),
=
Rw(1− τ)
p
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
Rw(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
+ p(1− ψ)zˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
)
Given that z = τl1−τ , l+ z becomes
l
1−τ and c =
Rw
p (1 +
pψγ
d − pβRw(1−τ)). Substituting steady-
state values into Rw = αAk˜α−1(1 − α)Ak˜α, yields Rw = αA((1 − α)A) α1−α . Therefore, each
steady-state level is derived as follows.
hg =
dβ
αA((1− α)A) α1−α (1− τ)
, hb =
β
αA((1− α)A) α1−α (1− τ)
,
and
c =
αA((1− α)A) α1−α
p
(
1 +
pψγ
d
− pβ
(1− τ)αA((1− α)A) α1−α
)
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